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It is hard to discover the precise limits of a legal doctrine
which is undergoing a continual expansion. As litigation
increases and the stream of decisions flows onward, it is difficult at any one point to map out the exact extent of territory
covered. As old surveys lose their value except as furnishing
the lines and directions upon which new ones may be made,
the progress of the student becomes necessarily slow and cautious, and the fact that the principle whose extended application
is to be investigated is a well worn and familiar one, serves
only to increase the magnitude and consequently the difficulties of the task.
The principle which allows a recovery of money illegally
demanded and paid under circumstances of duress is too
elementary in its nature, and too deeply implanted in our
practice to become the subject of doubt or contention, Lut its
application, however, is varied and confusing. It is the object
of the present essay to investigate one particular class of cases
to which this principle of practice has been extended.
A payment under protest takes place where money is
illegally demanded and paid, the payer adding to his act of
payment a more or less formal declaration to the eflect that
the money so paid is wrongfully exacted. The English
case of Shaw v. Woodcock et al., 7 B & C. 73, may be
taken as a good example of a payment under protest. It
there appeared that the defendants had had in their possession
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certain policies of insurance belonging to the plaintiff, and that
the plaintiff, through his attorney, had asked the defendants to
deliver up these policies, but that the latter insisted upon retaining them in possession upon an unfounded claim of lien.
There had been several business transactions between the
parties, and the defendants claimed that the plaintiff owed them
a certain sum of money. It was to compel a satisfaction of
this debt that the defendants claimed a lien upon the policies.
The attorney of the plaintiff in order to obtain the latter paid
the amount of the demand, handing the defendants at the time
a statement in writing signed by his client, to the effect that he
paid the money in order to obtain possession of the policies,
and on no other account, and "that by such payment he did
not mean to admit that they (the defendants) were entitled to
a lien for the amount, or to any amount, on the said policies;
and he (the plaintiff) would bring an action to recover back
the sum so paid." In this case a recovery was obtained in an
action for money had and received.
The phrase "payment under protest" must not prove misleading. Those payments which should properly be grouped by
themselves, because of the fact that a protest accompanies them
are much fewer in number than we might suppose. The great
mass of cases usually cited in explanation of the heading, payment under protest, are not illustrative of this species of payments, but are in fact examples of a much larger class. This
larger class consists of all payments made under circumstances
of duress, and includes those made under protest. MMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 365 ; Preston v. Boston, 12 Pick. I3;
Detroit v. Martin, 22 Am. Rep. 512 ; Forrest v. Mayor, 12 Abb.
Prac. Rep. (N. Y.) 350; Railroad Company v. Commissioners,
98 U. S. 542.
It will be seen upon a moment's reflection that the circumstance of duress, not the circumstance of the protest, is the
real ground upon which the plaintiff must subsequently base
his action to recover. The duress being the cause, and the
protest only an accompanying condition of the recovery, it is
evident that we must study the larger class if we would comprehend the smaller. We must carry with us into our investi-
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gation of the protest the principles of wider application which
guide the courts in deciding upon the question of compulsion;
we must analyze the characteristics of the genus, if our investigation of the species is to be attended with practical results.
In doing so, however, it will not be necessary to investigate
all compulsory payments. The old duress per minas or by
imprisonment so controls the body or enslaves the mind of
the oppressed person as often to preclude even the possibility
of a protest being made by him, while its character is so pronounced that any notice given to the oppressor of the wrong
he is committing, would be only futile and superfluous. But
where the character of the duress is more equivocal and the
limits of the coercion not so easily recognized, where in other
words the compulsion has begun to fade into persuasion-there
on the border line, as it were, between involuntary and voluntary payments, shall we find the protest. For these reasons
our investigation of compulsory payments as apart from
payments under protest may be narrowed down to an
analysis only of those payments where the illegal compulsion exercised upon the payer is one of the more questionable
kind. We shall then pass over in silence payments made
under the old durities of life or limb, or by imprisonment, and
confine ourselves wholly to those induced by the more refined,
and, so to speak, tenuous forms of duress, which are peculiar
to our modern practice.
I.

PAYMENTS

UNDER

THE

MODERN

FORMS

SOME OF THE LIMITS OF THE MODERN DOCTRINE.
PROPERTY.

THE

WITHHOLDING OF A LEGAL

OF

DURESS.

DURESS OF

DUTY.

How far have the Courts advanced beyond the limits of the
old duress ? Lord Kenyon said in 1798, Fulham v. Down,
6 Esp. Rep. 26, that "where a voluntary payment was made
of an illegal demand tlhe party knowing the demand to be illegal, without an immediate and urgent necessity (or unless to
redeem or preserve your person or goods), it is not the subject
of an action for money had and received." This dictum has
been quoted in many of the cases: Palpy v. Manly, I. M. G.
and S. 5; Wabaunsee County v. Walker, 8 Kan. 431; Lamborn
v. County Commissioners,97 U. S. 181 : Railroad Co. v. Con-
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missioners, 98 U. S, 541; Union Insurance Co. v. Allegheny,
ioi Pa. St. 257 (Chief Justice Mercer).
The phrase under an immediate and urgent necessity may be
taken as still expressing the limits of the law on this subject.
See Chief Justice Waite's opinion in RailroadCo. v. Commissioners, 8 Otto, 541 ; see also De La Questa v. Insurance Co.,
136 Pa., 62. In a case, for instance, which came before the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, Cook v. Boston, 9 Allen, 393,
it appeared that some wagon owners had for three years paid
under protest to the City of Boston larger license fees than were
legally demandable. Judge Dewey declared that they had
shown no ground on which to found an action for money had
and received. They had not offered a sufficient excuse to the
Court for paying the excessive license fees. If those fees were
excessive, and it was admitted that they were so, they had at
the time of their exaction a valid defence against any action
that the city might have brought against them. It was clearly
their duty then to refuse to pay the sum illegally demanded,
and await the institution of legal proceedings by the city. Payments, the court continued, to a tax collector armed with legal
process to enforce his claims, were in no sense analogous to
the case presented by the plaintiffs, for in those cases the party
has no opportunity to appear in court and plead or argue in
his defence, as the warrant of distress is already out against
him. The temporary inconvenience to which the licensee
might have been subjected by the institution of legal proceedings against him was not to be considered as amounting to a
circumstance of duress. In short, in this case the necessity
under which the plaintiff paid was neither urgent nor 'immediate.
Indeed, a licensee must in most cases dispute at the threshold the exaction of an excessive fee. The mere fact that his
business will be subjected to an interruption through the necessity of defending himself against the exaction of the fee will
not of itself constitute a circumstance of duress. There have
been many decisions to this effect in this country: Cook v.
Boston, 9 Allen, 393; Mays v. Cincinnati, I Ohio St., 274;
Allentown v. Scaegar, 20 Pa. St., 421 ; Baker v. City, I I Ohio, St.
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534 (contra). The only apparent exception to this rule that
we have seen is the case of Leonardv. City of Canton, 35 Miss.,
189, decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi. The facts,
however, that influenced the Judge who decided this case were
themselves exceptional. The plaintiff, it seems, had obtained
a license from the County Board of Police, authorizing him to
retail vinous and spirituous liquors in the town of Canton for
the period of twelve months from the first of January, 1857.
The corporate authorities of the town during the months of
February and March following passed sundry ordinances on
the subject of retailing under''which the plaintiff was obliged to
take out another license for the remainder of the year. Although the payment of this'latter license fee was not accompanied by a protest he was allowed to recover the amount exacted from him. The Suprerhe Court of Mississippi, having decided that the corporate authorities of the town had no right
under their charter to demand a fresh license fee, did not hesitate in concluding that the plaintifi had a valid ground of
action. It will be seen, however, that the defendant in this
case had committed more than a merely technical illegality;
the town authorities had actually disturbed the plaintiff in the
enjoyment of a license which they had already granted him.
This decision should not therefore be used as an authority for
the position that a licensee can under ordinary circumstances
recover the amount of an illegal fee exacted from him.
On the other hand, where the destruction of one's business
is threatened the payment will be regarded as compulsory. In
a Pennsylvania case, Lelighk Coal and Navigation Company v.
Brown & Lawall,to use, etc., 13 V. N. C., 8I, decided in
1883, it appeared that the defendant, a navigation company
upon the Lehigh river had threatened to draw the water from
one of its dams, if the plaintiff, who was a log owner, refused to
pay the amount of certain tolls. If the defendant had carried
out its threat the plaintiff could not have got his logs to his
mill and his busincss would have been " practically ruined ".
The tolls thus paid, having been proved illegal, were regarded
by the Supreme Court as recoverable, the payment having
been manifestly an involuntary one.
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,In thus suggesting at the outset some of the limits which
the Courts have placed upon that compulsion which they
deem sufficient to render a payment involuntary, Mr. Justice
iField's words in Brumagin v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal., 265,
imay very properly be quoted. They are as follows: " It
Imay in general be said that there must be some actual or
/threatened exercise of power possessed or supposed to be posi sessed by the party exacting or receiving the payment over
the person or property of the person making the payment,
from which the latter has no other means of immediate relief."
The current of judicial legislation in this matter of involuntary payments has long been flowing in one channel. A
threatened wrongful seizure or detention of one's goods has
since the beginning of the eighteenth century been regarded
as sufficient to give the payer his subsequent right of action.
The existence of a duress of property in connection with involuntary payments is now no longer to be questioned. It has
become an establ.shed principle of law.' The C6urts, however,
have gone one step further. As the detention of one's goods
will often render a payment involuntary, so will sometimes the
withholding of one's rights. The latter wag'at first recognized
in cases where the parties were on an unequal footing, as, for
instance, where an officer demanded an excessive fee or a
creditor-annexed an illegal condition to a composition deed
and so extorted money from his debtor, Smith v. Cuffe, 6 M.
& Selw., 16o: see Smith on Contracts, pp. 300-302, and cases
cited; Chitty on Contracts,912, and cases cited. The same
principle has been since applied in England to the case of a
common carrier exacting an excessive rate for the performance
of a legal duty: Parker v. Great Western Railway Company,
7 M. and Gr., 252; Great Western Railway v. Sutton, L. R.
4 H. L. C., 249; and in this country it has been recognized in
a few analogous instances; Hearsey v. Pryn, 7 Johns., 179;
Hearsey v. Boyd, 7 Johns., 182; Ripley v. Gelston, 9 Johns,
201.

A hasty glance at the text books and the cases is enough
to show one that the instances of money paid under a duress

THE RECOVERY OF MONEY PAID UNDER PROTEST.

647

of property strictly speaking far outnumber the instances of
money paid in order to induce the performance of a legal
duty. Still, in order to help us in this discussion, it will be
well for us to make such a classification of the cases. Money,
then, is, under certain conditions, recoverable by an action for
money had and received which the plaintiff was obliged to pay
in order.
(I) To avert a wrongful seizure or detention of his property,
and
(II) To induce the defendant to perform a duty which was
legally due the plaintiff without such payment..
We shall consider in turn these classes of payments.
(I) The phrase duress of property,crude as it is, has the sanction of the best authorities; Baron Parke, 6 Exch. 345; Id.
704; Block's Case, 8 Ct. of Claims, 461.
The property is almost always personalty. Some of our
judges have doubted, while others have even denied, the existence of a duress of real property. It is, however, reasonable and more in harmony with the cases, to admit the existence of a duress of real property, though for reasons to
which we shall hereafter advert, it is of very rare occurrence.
See Mr. Justice Bradley's decision in Sanborn v. Commissioners, 98 U. S. 181.
Perhaps the first recognition of a duress of goods is to be
found in 20 Liber Assisarum, 14 (Part 5 of the Year Books).
The question as to its validity arose upon an assize of novel
disseisin. The demandant, an abbot, it appeared, had released all his right in a certain manor to the tenant. The release, however, had been extorted "per dures fait al 'Abbe per
prisel de ses bestes." The release was adjudged void. The
report says that there had been no duress of imprisonment,
and, although only a hWreloutline of the facts is presented, it is
safe to say that the Court of King's Bench in deciding for the
abbot did so upon the ground of the duress of property to,
which he had been subjected. This case is cited in both
Rolle's and D'Anvers' Abridgements under the head of duress.
See this case referred to in Oates v. Hudson, 6 Exch. 348.
The particular principle decided in this case is no longer
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part of the law of England. A man may not now avoid a contract by pleading duress of goods. In Summer v. Ferryman,
i i Mod. 2oi; a decision which has been sometimes cited
as overruling the old case to which we have refarred,
the property which Was made the subject of the alleged
duress did not actually belong to the plaintiff. The words of
Powell, J., in that case, to the effect that a man can avoid a
deed only by proving personal duress, must therefore be regarded more or less as an obiter dictum. But Lord Denman's
decision in the case of Skeate v.. Beali, I I Ad. & El. 99 o ,
coupled with Baron Parke's opinion as expressed in Parkerv.
7he Bristol and Ezeter Railway Company, 6 Exch. 702; Oates
v. Hudson, Id. 348; Atlee v. Blackhouse, 3 M. and W. 633;
Pratt v. Vizard, 5 B. Ad. 8o8; and Kearns v. Durell,6 C. B.
596 (6o E. C. L. R.), leave no room for doubt as to the law on
the subject in England to-day. In Parker v. Railway Co.
Baron Parke says: "The mere duress of goods does not avoid
a contract." The weight of American authority is apparently
to the same effect, but the question seems to have come before
our courts only. in b. few instances. Hazelriggv. Donaldson, 2
Metc. (Ky.) 445; Maissonaire v. Keating, 2 Gall. 337; Sas*portas v. Jennings, 2 Bay 211 (contra); see also Parsons on
Contracts, I., 393.
It is possible to conceive of two species of -duress of goods.
First, it may be that the goods are still in the possession of
their rightful owner, and that the payee' threatens wrongfully
to seize them. Or, secondly, it may happen that the goods
are already in the possession of the payee, and that he threatens
wrongfully to detain them.
(I.) Payments made to avert a wrongful seizure.
The seizure is usually that which takes place under color of
law. It is usually that of a sheriff or government collector,
and seldom that of a private individual.
It is now well settled in this country that a payment of taxes
to a collector who has a warrant in his hands, authorizing him
immediately to levy on the payer's goods for the amount of
the taxes, is not a voluntary payment. Joyner v. Third School
District, etc., 3 Cush. 567; Amesbury Co. v. Inhabitants, 17
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Mass. 461; Boston Glass Company v. Boston, 4 Metc. 181 ;
Preston v. City, 12 Pick. 17; Atwater v. Woodbridge, 6 Conn.
223; Wilson v. Mayor, etc., I Ab. Prac. Rep. 26; Bradfordv.
Chicago, 25 Ill. 411 ; Note to Detroit v. Martin, 22 Am. Rep.
512; Dew v. Parsons,2 B. & Ald. 562.
In the Boston andSandwich Glass Company v. The City ofBoston, 4 Metc. 181, a leading case to which it will be well to refer at
length, the company was allowed to recover the amount of certain taxes which had been illegally assessed against it between
the years 1826 and 1839 inclusive. It appeared that up to the
year 1839 the plaintiff had paid without protest the amount of
these taxes to the defendant's collector after receiving the usual
tax bills, to which was added the following statement:"By avote ofthetown, passed 27 th of May, 181 I,the taxes must
be paid within sixty days from the time they are issued. At the
expiration of the sixty days, the treasurer by law is directed to
issue a summons to those who are then delinquent, and, if the
tax is not paid in ten days after such summons, with twenty
cents for such summons, to issue his warrants to the special
collectors, who will receive from the delinquents, in addition
to the tax, the fees allowed by law on serving executions, viz.,
four per cent. on first $Ioo, and one and a half per cent. on all
over $200.

Interest will also be charged."

" Richard D. Harris, Treasurer and Collector, Boston, September ist."
The taxes illegally exacted in the year 1839 were paid by
the plaintiff on the day after they became payable, but before
the usual summons required by the law in the case of nonpayment was issuable. The plaintiff made no verbal objection.
at the time the taxes were paid, although by its agent it immediately afterwards sent a written protest to Mr. Harris, the
Treasurer and Collector . Judge Dewey, when the case came
before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, allowed the company to recover the amount of all these taxes. They had all.
been paid, those assessed prior to 1839 as well as those assessed
during that year, in order to avert an otherwise inevitable
seizure and sale of personal property. The fact that a protest
had accompanied only the payment made in the year 1839,
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did not limit the plaintiff to a recovery of the taxes paid at that
time.
So in Hospital v. Philadelpha County, I2 Harris, 229; it
appeared that certain property belonging to the plaintiff and
legally exempt from taxation had been nevertheless assessed
by the defendant's officer. Under a warrant of distress certain
goods of the plaintiff had been consequently levied on. To
prevent their being sold, the plaintiff paid under protest the
amount of the assessment. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania allowed the plaintiff to recover the amount so paid.
The doctrine as to the recovery of taxes illegally assessed
and paid in order to avert a sale of personality has received an
important limitation from the hands of the Supreme Court of
the United States. It would appear from the case of the Railroad Company v. Commissioners, etc., 98 U. S. 541, that an
actual demand must have been made by the collector, and that
the seizure and sale to prevent which the payment was made
must have been imminent. The case is one which is so often
cited that it will be advisable to dwell upon it at some length.
It was a suit to recover back taxes for the year 187o and 1871,
paid by the Union Pacific Railroad Company upon certain
lands in Nebraska. The suit was brought three years after
the last payment was made, and after the decision of the court
in Railway Company v. McShane, 22 Wall. 444,had been pronounced, which was supposed to hold that the lands in question were not subject to taxation. The other facts are stated
as follows in the opinion of the court:"The lands were returned by the United States land officers to
the State auditor and by him to the county clerk for taxation, as
required by the General Statutes of Nebraska, and were placed
upon the assessment list of the county. The general and the local
taxes levied for the respective years were carried against these
lands, with others upon the lists, and the railroad company designated as owner. In due time the tax lists, with warrants
attached for their collection, were delivered to the treasurer of
the county. The taxes for the year 187o became payable May
1, 1871, and those for 1871, May I, 1872. The warrants
authorized the treasurer, if default should be made in the pay-
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ment of any of the taxes charged upon the lists, to seize and
sell the personal property of the persons making the default to
enforce the collection."
No demand of taxes was necessary, but it was the duty of
every person subject to taxation to attend at the treasurer's
office and make payment. During the years 1870, 1871, 1872,
the railroad company was the owner of other lands in the
county, and other property, both real and personal, on which
taxes were properly levied. On the i i th of August, 1871, the
company attended at the treasurer's office, and paid all taxes
charged against it for the year 187o, and on the 2oth of July,
1872, all that were charged for the year 1871. Before these
payments were made, there had been no demand for the taxes,
and no special effort had been put forth by the treasurer for
their collection. The company had personal property in the
county which might have been seized; but no attempt had
been made to seize it, and no other notice than such as the law
implies had been given that payment would be enforced in
that way."
"At the time the several payments were made, the company
filed with the treasurer a notice in writing that it protested
against the taxes paid, for the reason that they were illegally
and wrongfully assessed and levied, and were wholly unauthorized by law, and that suit would be instituted to recover
back the money paid."
The late Chief Justice Waite, who delivered the opinion from
which we have quoted, which was adverse to the claim of the
railroad company, says, after reviewing the decisions:
"The real question in this case is whether there is such an
immediate and urgent necessity for the payment of the taxes
in controversy as to imply that it was made under compulsion.
The treasurer had a warrant in his hands which would have
authorized him to seize the goods of the company to
enforce the collection. This warrant was in the nature of an
execution running against the property of the parties charged
with taxes Upon the lists it accompanied and no opportunity
had been afforded the parties of obtaining a judicial decision of
the question of their liability. As to this class of cases, Chief
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Justice Shaw states the rule in Preston v. Boston, 12 Pick..
(Mass.), as follows: 'When, therefore, a party not liable to
taxation is called upon peremptorily to pay such 'a warrant,.
and he can save himself and his property in no other 'way than
by paying the illegal demand, he may give notice that he so
pays it by duress and not voluntarily, and by showing that he
is not liable, recover it back as money had and received."
This, we think, is the true rule, but it falls far short of what
is required in this case. No attempt had been made by the
treasurer to serve his warrant. He had not even personally
demanded the taxes from the company, and certainly nothing
had been done from which his intent could be inferred to
use the legal process he held to enforce the collection, if the
alleged illegality of the claim was made known to him. All.
that appears is, that the company was charged upon the tax
lists with taxes upon its real and personal property in the
county. After all the taxes had become delinquent under the
law, but before any active steps whatever had been taken to
enforce their collection, the company presented itself at the
treasurer's office, and in 'the usual course of business paid in
full everything that was charged against it, accompanying the
payment, however, with a general protest against the illegality
of the charges and a notice that suit would be commenced to
recover back the full amount that was paid." * * * * *
"Under the circumstances, we cannot hold that the payment
was compulsory in such a sense as to give a right to the present action." See in this connection Smith v. Inhabitants of
Redfield, 27 Me. 147; At-well v. Zeluff, 26 Mich. I 18; McKee
v. Campbell, 27 Mich. 500.
The payee may be a private individual seeking to enforce a
claim. In Valpy v. Manly, I M. G. & S. 594, a conflict arose
between the assignees in bankruptcy of a certain firm and the
under sheriff who'had been charged with the execution of a
fi.fa. against the property of the firm. An entry had been
made upon the premises under the sheriff's warrant, indeed an
inventory had been made, and in the course of making
the inventory a cart-shed had been broken open and a wagon
taken out. The assignees finally sent a clerk to the under
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-sheriff's office to inquire whether or not the sheriff intended to
-sell; and upon the under sheriff saying that the latter did
intend to sell, the assignees' clerk paid under protest the
-amount claimed upon the writ. It was clear from the facts of
the case that the assignees, who were the plaintiffs, were already
in possession of the premises, and that consequently the
threatened seizure by the sheriff would have been unauthorized.
Tindal, C. J., and Judges Coltman, Cresswell, and Erle, were
-all of the opinion that the plaintiff had made out a valid right
0
of action.
For reasons to which we shall hereafter refer, a dispute as to
the payment of rent cannot be settled by the payment of a
particular rental followed by an action for money had and
received for its recovery. A threatened distress for rent
will not be regarded as a valid ground for the subsequent
recovery, replevin at the time being manifestly the pro-per and convenient form of action to which the plaintiff should
have resorted: Lindon v. looptr, Cowp. 414; Knibbs v. Hall,
Esp. 84; Colwell v. Peden, 3 Watts, 327. So also wherever a
special action is given by statute, there, if such action will
satisfy the peculiar exigencies of the plaintiff's case, the law
would rather have him adopt the course which it has marked
out for him. Phillipsv.Jefferson Co., 5 Kans. 412.
2. Payments made to prevent a wrongful detention of personality.
Bayley, J., in Shaw v. Woodcock, 7 B. & C. 73, lays
it down as a general rule, that "if a party has in his possession
goods or other property belonging to another, and refuses to
deliver such property to that other unless the latter pays him a
sum of money which he has no right to receive, and the latter,
in order to obtain possession of his property pays that sum,
the money so paid is a payment made by compulsion, and may
be recovered back." In Ashmole v. Wainwright, 2 Q. B.
937, Patterson, J., declared:
"I never doubted that an
action for money had and received, might be maintained
to recover money paid on the wrongful detainer of the goods;
it would be very dangerous to do so, the doctrine being in
itself so reasonable, and supported by so many authorities."
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And in the same case Coleridge, J., used words that were
almost identical with those which we have quoted. See also
opinion of Reed, J., in White v. Hey/man, lo Casey, 142.
The act by which the payee has obtained possession of the

property may have been in itself either legal or illegal. It
may have been under the sanction of legal authority, as where
a customs collector seized goods passing through his hands
for the payment of a duty, or it may have been made by a
private individual without even the color of legal authority.
The case of [Z-vinl v. Wilson, 4 Term, 485, was an action for
money had and received to recover the amount of certain
duties wrongfully demanded and paid under alleged circumstances of duress. The evidence showed that while the plaintiff was on his way from Scotland into England with some
hams, the latter had been wrongfully seized and detained by
officers ot the customs A permit which allowed him to bring
the hams across the border free of duty was in one of the
plaintiff's wagons which had not yet come up when the seizure
was made. But the officers even after they had seen the permit, refused to deliver up the hams unless certain duties were
paid upon them. The plaintiff objected to the exaction. He,
however, paid the amount demanded in order to recover possession of his hams. Lord Kenyon was clearly of the opinion
that since the money so paid was not legally demandable the
plaintiff was entitled to recover it. This case has been followed
by numerous decisions to the same effect, both in England and
in this country. See Chitly on Contracts,940, and cases cited;
Campbell v. Hall,Cowp. 2o4; E/liottv. Swartwout, IO Pet. 137 ;
Greeley v. Thompson, Io How. 226; Maxwell v. Griswold. IO
How. 242, 246.
In Clinton v. Strong, 9 Johns. 370, a case often cited, an
American ship had been seized by a United States collector
for having violated certain provisions of the Non-Intercourse
Acts, and a libel had been filed against her in the District
Court. The Act of March 2d, 18Ii, having repealed
the special act under which the seizure had been made,
the ship and her cargo were liberated by the custom
house authorities, but the marshal of the Court refused to
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allow the plaintiffs (the owners of the vessel) to land their
cargo until the amount of certain bills and fees was paid by
them. The plaintiffs objected to these charges, but in order
to land their cargo they paid the amount demanded. The
Supreme Court of the State held that this payment of costs could
not be considered as a voluntary act. "They were exacted by
the officer colore ofici, as a condition of the re-delivery of the
property. It would lead to the grossest abuse, to hold a payment made under such circumstances to be a volutary payment,
precluding the party from contesting it afterwards."
It frequently happeus that a commission broker wrongfully
detains property in his hands in order to satisfy a groundless
claim of lien: Briggsv.Boyd, 56 N.Y. 289. Sometimes a common
carrier extorts an excessive charge from a consignee by refusing to deliver up goods which have been consigned to him:
Chitly on Contracts,941 and cases cited ; Baxendale v. Great
Western Co., 32 L. J. C. P. 225; S. C. affirmed, Cockburn,
C. J., 33 Id. 197. In these cases money paid in order to
obtain a delivery of the goods so detained, may generally be
recovered back.
In the well-known case of Astley v. Reynolds, 2 Strange, 915,
the plaintiff had pawned a piece of plate to the defendant for
twenty pounds. When the time for the payment of the debt
arrived, the plaintiff tendered the defendant the principal and
four pounds interest, but the latter would not deliver up the
plate unless the plaintiff paid him ten pounds interest. After
some months, the plaintiff made him another tender of the
principal and four pounds interest, but, as the defendant still
insisted upon the ten pounds interest, the plaintiff then
paid the full amount demanded of him. The court allowed
the plaintiff to recover the difference between the amount
of interest extorted from him and the amount which
was legally due upon the debt. The court said: "We think
also that this is a payment by compulsion; the plaintiff might
have had such an immediate want of his goods, that an action
of trover would not do his business. Where the rule volenti
non fit i'juia is applied, it must be where the party had the
freedom of exercising his will, which this man had not; we
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must take it that he paid the money, relying on his legal
Temedy to get it back again:" 2 Strange, 915, 916. The
court, it seems, did not intend to say that in all cases the
wronful detention of a chattel would be sufficient to make a
payment compulsory, but only that where the payer had
reason to believe that an action for the recovery of the specific
chattel would not accomplish his purpose, there his payment
would be regarded as compulsory.
Judge Spencer, in Hall v. Schultz, et. al., 4 Johnson's
Reports, 240, said that this case in Strange had been subsequently overruled by Knibbs v. Hall, I Esp. 84. With all due
deference to the learned New York jurist, it would seem that
the latter case is not really in conflict with the principle of
Astley v. Reynolds. In Knibbs v. Hall,the plaintiff had rented
some chambers of the defendant, and had paid a larger rental
for them than was legally due, in order to avoid a threatened
distress. Lord Kenyon, as we might have supposed, would
not allow the plaintiff to recover on the ground that replevin
and was the proper mode of settling such a dispute between a
tenant and his landlord. The relation of pawnbroker and customer on the other hand suggested no particular form of action
as peculiarly appropriate where the pawnbroker refuses to
deliver up the thing pawned. The facts in Hall v. Schultz et al.,
were not at all analogous to those in Astley v. Reynolds.
Indeed, Judge Spencer says himself, "without undertaking to
pronounce between the cases cited " (Astley v. Reynolds
and Knibbs v. Hall), " the present differs from both." It
appears that the defendants, had agreed to buy a piece of
ground of the plaintiff which was to be sold upon an execution, and afterwards to re-convey the land in question to the
plaintiff, upon the plaintiff paying them the sum advanced
together with a reasonable compensation for their services.
Afterwards, when the plaintiff tendered them the amount of the
sum they had advanced, together with what the court subsequently regarded as a reasonable compensation, the defendants
refused to re-convey except upon the payment of an additional
$3OO. The plaintiff objected to this demand, but finally paid it.
The court, Judge Thompson alone dissenting, concurred in the
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opinion that the plaintiff's action for a recovery of the sum so
paid was not maintainable. Judge Spencer pointed out that the
original agreement, not being in writing, could have been
avoided by the defendants, had the plaintiff brought an action
upon it. It was necessary, then, to regard the plaintiff as having paid the money just as any other purchaser of the property
might have done. The defendants had a right to make their
own terms, and, if the plaintiff" voluntarily and with his eyes
open, fixed the compensation claimed by the defendants, and
paid them the money, he could have no claim to call on the
court to aid him in getting rid of what he conceived an unconscientious advantage." This decision, then, does not necessarily militate against the principle upon which the English
case in 2d Strange was decided. Indeed Astley v. Reynolds
is still cited by the best authorities as representing the
law both in England and this country: Chitly on Contracts,
940; Greenleaf on Evidence, II., § 121 ; Parsons on Contracts,
I., 392; Atlee v. Blackhouse, (Parke,B.), 3 M. & W. 633-650;
Wakefield v. Newborn (Ld. Denman), 6 Q. B. 276.
After citing Astley v. Reynolds, and noting the fact that in
that case the plaintiff might' have had trover for his goods,
Chitty in his book on Contracts, continues: "So if a party
pay an arbitrator in order to take up an award a sum larger
than is reasonably due to such arbitrator in respect of fees,
etc., he may, it appears, sue for the excess in this action." In
the same connection he instances the cases of Wakefield v.
Newborn, 6 Q. B. 276, and Close v. Phips, 7 M. & G. q86, in
both of which money that had been paid under protest to obtain the possession of title deeds was subsequently recovered.
In the latter case, where "the attorney of a mortgagee who had
a power of sale refused to stop the sale or deliver up the title
deeds of the mortgaged property except on the payment by the
mortgagor of certain expenses not properly chargeable, it
was held that the administratrix of the mortgager, who "had
paid the excess under protest, could recover it in this action, although the right of the plaintiff to stop the sale was an equitable right only." It has thus been decided in Pennsylvania
that where a person gets possession of a deed and by threats
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to destroy it extorts money from another who is interested
therein, the payment is involuntary and may be recovered
back: Motz v. AMitchell, 91 Pa. St., I14; see also Cartwright
v. Rowley, 2 Esp. 723; Oates v. Hudson, 6 Exch. 345.
3. Payments under duress of realproperty.
It has been only during the last fifty years that cases of
payments alleged to have been made under compulsion in
order to avert a threatened divestiture of title to real.property
have found a place in our reports. The questions arising in
this connection are perplexing, and we shall be able to do little
more than set forth in some detail what are perhaps the leading cases. The decisions on the subject, as far as we know,
are almost all American. Johnson, J., in the Ohio case of
Stephen v. Daniels, 27 Ohio St., 544, indeed, cites Wakefield
v. Newborn, 6 Q. B. 276, an English decision, as an instance of
duress of real property. There, as has been seen, money paid
under protest by a mortgager to obtain title deeds, withheld on
an unfounded claim of lien, was afterwards recovered back.
This case and others of a similar nature where money was
paid in order to obtain certain muniments of title wrongfully
withheld, seem more properly to fall under the class of payments made in order to prevent a wrongful detention of personal property. See Smith v. Sleab, Iz M. & W., 585 ; Close v.
Phzps, 7 Man. & Gr. 586. The same Judge, in deciding the
Ohio case already cited, says: " Perhaps the true reason
why the rule at common law did not extend to lands as
well as goods was the fact that at common law lands
could not be sold on execution to satify any money demand.
The capias ad satisfaciendum was a command to take
the body, the fierifacias to take the goods and chattels,
and the levari facias reached goods and the profits of
the land. The land itself could not be sold." Indeed there is
now only one class of cases in which a duress of realty can
arise. It may arise upon a summary proceeding against land
for the satisfaction of a money claim. One of our Judges
suggests that a duress of real property may exist where a
mortgagee has a power of sale without the institution of legal
proceed ngs, or where, "a mortgager is in possession after
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condition broken." .Deady,j., in A zarzosa v. Bowman, Deady,
228. But the only familiar instance is that of the payment of an
illegal tax made in order to avert a sale of realty or to prevent
the delivery of a deed after such a sale to the holder of the
sheriff's certificate.
A summaiy proceeding against real estate for the satisfaction of a money claim has seldom been allowed by statute,
and for reasons upon which we shall hereafter enlarge, the
compulsion of legal process which might by an appearance in
court have been averted, can never constitute duress: Taylorv. Board of Health, 7 Casey 73.
Real property is not perishable, and a merely nominal and
temporary divestiture of title can work no irreparable injury
to the rightful owner. Under most circumstances his proper
course will be to refuse to pay, although the proceeding is:
summary in its nature and allows him no opportunity to.
appear and make defence to it. In Forrestet al.v. the Mayor,
etc., 13 Abb. Prac. Repts. (N. Y.) 350, the executors of one
Daniel Fanshaw, deceased, sought to recover the amount of
an assessment paid by-their principal, as they alleged, under
circumstances of illegal compulsion, It appeared that the testator had paid under protest the amount of this demand in
order, as he alleged, to prevent his land from being sold, but
it also appeared that the sale of his property might have been
otherwise averted by contesting in court the legality of the
assessment. Upon a subsequent application of the testator to
one of the Judges of the Supreme Court the assessment had
been set aside for fraud and illegality. When, however, the
executors sought in this action to recover the amount so paid
the same court denied their right of action, holding that
the payment by the testator had been purely voluntary. He
ought clearly to have zesisted the demand. His land would
not have "disappeared or perished," neither would his title
have been impaired while he was taking the pruper steps to
contest the illegal or fraudulent assessment.
In the case we have just referred to a vendee at the sale,
had such a sale been held, would not have taken even a colorable title to the property. Where, however, such a sale
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would give a colorable title, there being no other way open
'to the owner to avert the sale save by a payment of the claim,
the ends of justice require a different answer. Detroit v. Mar,tin, 22 Am. Rep., 512; Lamborn v. County Commissioners, 97
U. S. pp. 187-188.
It would appear indeed that where the owner, of his own
motion, satisfies an unfounded lien against his property he
may not afterwards recover the amount of money so paid; but
where a demand is made upon him by a person who has
power and authority summarily to sell the realty in order to
-satisfy the claim, there, if the sale would have been such as
would give to a vendee colorable title, the money so paid is
-afterwards recoverable.
1n Marzposa Co. v. Denma, Deady, 228, a decree of fore-closure under a mortgage upon a certain piece of land in California had been duly satisfied. The Sheriff, however, wholly
disregarding this fact, sold the property to the defendant. The
latter received from the Sheriff a certificate of sale, and the
plaintiff, in order to prevent a deed from issuing on this certificate, paid to the defendant the sum which he pretended to
have given-there had been some collusion between him and
the mortgagee-for the property at sale, together with interest
thereon and the fee for the certificate. It was clear that this
was a voluntary payment. The plaintiff had paid of his own
accord the money in order to satisfy an unfounded claim
against his property.
In Fleetwood v. The City of New York, 2 Sandf. Su. Ct.
Repts., 475, the owner of certain lots which had been sold by
the city authorities in order to satisfy certain illegal assessments had, in order to redeem the lots, paid under protest to
the street commissioners the amount for which they had
been sold. The owner subsequently brought this action
against the city to recover back the money that he had so
paid. The court regarded the payment as a voluntary one,
holding that the muniments of title upon an assessment sale
consisted of several proceedings, and that in this case, according to the plaintiff's own showing, at least three links in the
chain of these proceedings were wanting. In other words,
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each of these proceedings formed an essential part of the
record of the assessment title, and in their absence the title
would have been void upon its face. The Court adds: "The.
assertion of a title under such conveyance, or a lien by virtue
of such judgment, does not afford a ground for equitable
interference; much less does it constitute legal compulsion."
In Detroit v. Martin, 22 Am. Rep., 512, the plaintiff belowhad paid under protest the amount of an assessment for the.
opening of a certain street in the City of Detroit. The law
under which the assessment had been levied and collected, was
subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Courtof Michigan. The latter tribunal, however, would not allow
a recovery of the money so paid. The payer had had, indeed,
no alternative, the proceedings against his land having
been of a summary kind; but the sale would not have consti-.
tuted a cloud upon his title, and the threat of it could not
therefore be regarded as a circumstance of compulsion. Judge
Marston, in delivering the opinion in this case, said that ifthe sale would have constituted a cloud upon the plaintiff's
title his right to a recovery would have been sustained. The
Judge quoted with approval the following passage from Cooley.
on Taxation, 542: "A cloud upon one's title is something
which constitutes an apparent incumbrance upon it; something that shows prima facie some right of a third party
either to the whole or some interest in it. An illegal tax may
or may not constitute such a cloud. If the alleged tax has no.
semblance of legality, if upon the face of the proceedings.
it is wholly unwarranted by law, or for any reason totally
void, so that any.person inspecting the record and comparing
it with the law is at once apprised of the illegality, the tax,
it would seem, could r either constitute an incumbrance nor
an apparent defect of title, and, therefore, in law could
constitute no cloud." But see in this connection the opinion
of Deady, J., in Mariposa Co. v. Bowman, Deady, 228.
Step/an v. Daniels et al., 27 Ohio St. 528, was an action
against a county treasurer to recover back an assessment
afterwards admitted to have been illegal. Before December
20, 1868, the plaintiffs below, who, it seems, had other taxes.
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due on that day as well as this assessment, tendered to the
treasurer the other taxes, which he declined to receive unless
the amount due on the assessment VWas also paid. This was
declined by the plaintiffs. The property was returned delinquent for both taxes and assessment, and the real estate was
advertised to be sold on January 19, 1859, at a delinquent tax
sale in order to satisfy these claims. On the I 3 th of January,
1869, the plaintiffs, in order to release the land from custody
and prevent its being sold, paid the taxes and the illegal
assessment under protest. The right to a recovery in this
case rested, it is true, upon a particular statute. The Court,
however, after an exhaustive review of the cases, came to the
conclusion that the plaintiffs below had also at common law a
right of action. After declaring that according to the more
modern authorities the rule as to the compulsory payment of
'taxes should not be limited to cases where "persons or goods"
alone are in jeopardy, the court said: "The cases cited
abundantly support the broader statement of the rule as laid
down in Mays v. Cincinnati, I Ohio St. 274, that where
money is- paid under protest to an officer on summary
process without a day in court, to prevent a sale of property,
-eal or personal,it may be recovered back." See also Thompson v. Kelley, 2 Ohio St. 651 ; City of Marrietta v. Slocomb, 6
Ohio St. 471; Bradfordv. Chicago, 25 Ill. 411; Elston v. Chi4ago, 40 Ill. 514; Phillips v. Jefferson County, 5 Kan. 412;
Waubaunse v. Cougty, 8 Kan. 43 1 ; Lamborn v. Commissioners,
In a California case (Hays v. Hogan, 5 Cal. 241,
9 7U. S. i8i.
it appeared that the collector of a town had demanded a larger
tax than was legal, and had also proceeded summarily to
recover the same when he should have proceeded by suit.
-Theplaintiff bought in his land in order to protect his title from
a cloud. The duress was admitted by the Judge who decided
this case, although he also based his decision in favor of the
plaintiff upon the ground that as purchaser at a void sale he
had received nothing for his money. See comments on this
case in Deady, 232; and 22 Am. Rep. 512.
In Insurance Co. v. City of Allegheny, IOI Pa. St. 250,
the plaintiff had bought in a certain piece of property at a
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mortgage sale, the deed delivered to the plaintiff for the
property so sold having been executed by the Sheriff,
July 21st, 1877. The facts were summed up as follows by
the late Chief Justice Mercur, who delivered the opinion in
the case: "Municipal taxes had been assessed on the property for the year I875 and i876, which could not be collected
for want of goods and chattels on which to levy. In March,
1878, claims for these taxes were filed in the Prothonotary's
office, uuder the act of I4th of June, 1863, which provided for
the entry of judgment thereon, the issuing of execution
forthwith, and the sale of the real estate. Execution had
issued on one of the judgments thus obtained; the real estate
then owned by the plaintiff was levied on and advertised to be
sold. The plaintiff paid the judgment under protest. A year
thereafter the City Solicitor demanded of the plaintiff payment
of the other judgment for the taxes of 1876 with a threat that
unless paid he would proceed to enforce payment by sale of
its property. The plaintiff thereupon paid this judgment
under protest. This action is to recover the sums thus paid
for taxes, interest and costs covered by both judgments." It
was conceded that the lien of the taxes had been divested by
the Sheriff's sale under the mortgage. The late Chief Justice
did not, however, think the company had a right to recover.
He says: "No authority is found which holds that money
paid to prevent the sale of lands under a threat to sell the
same on a judgment which is not a lien thereon, can be
recovered back by reason thereof." But besides basing his
opinion on this ground, he says that the plaintiff should have
availed itself of the equitable remedy open to it. This doctrine that the plaintiff should apply for an injunction restraining the collection of an illegal tax is, as we shall hereafter see,
peculiar to the Supremd Court of Pennsylvania. In Shaw v.
City of Allegheny, II5 Pa. St. 46, taxes were paid under
almobt identical circumstances, except that the plaintiff had
made a futile application to the equitable powers of the
Court. Upon this ground he was allowed a recovery. In this
connection see Espy v. Allison, 9 Watts, 462; Boas v. Updegrove, 5 Barr, 516.
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Referring to the fact that in the case of Stephan v. Daniels,
a legal tax had been combined with an illegal assessment, and
that perhaps a sale would have therefore conferred a valid title
upon the purchaser, Mr. Justice Bradley in Lamborn v. County
Commissioners,97 U. S. 181, says: "Where such would be the
effect of a tax sale, we cannot doubt that a payment of the tax
made to prevent it, should be regarded as compulsory and not
voluntary. The threatened divestiture of a man's title to land
is certainly as stringent a duress as the threatened seizure of
his goods; and if imminent and he has no other adequate
remedy to prevent it, justice requires that he should be permitted to pay the tax, and test its legality by an action to
recover back the money. But as in general an illegal tax
cannot furnish the basis of a legal sale, the case supposed cannot often arise."
IA. PAYMENTS MADE IN ORDER TO INDUCE THE DEFENDANT
TO PERFORM A DUTY WHICH WAS LEGALLY DUE THE PLAINTIFF
WITHOUT SUCH PAYMENT.

In the Great Western Railway Co. v. Sutton, L. R. 4 H. L.
C. 24 9 , a case which came before the House of Lords, Mr. Justice
Blackburn said: "I have always understood that when a man
pays more than he is bound to do by law for the performance
of a duty which the law says is owed to him for nothing, or
for less than he has paid, there is a compulsion or concussion in
respect of which he is entitled to recover the excess by condictio indebiti,or action for money had and received." Here
then is a compulsion arising from the threatened non-performance of a duty; the sin, as it were, being one of omission
rather than of commission. The old duress usually arises
through the commission of an illegal act or the threat of such
commission; but this modern refinement of the old duress
springs into being merely upon the threatened omission of a
duty.
It is now well settled in England that a shipper who, in
order to secure from a common carrier the performance of his
legal duty, pays a charge greater than that allowed by statute,
may, as a general rule, recover it back in an action for
money had and received: Parker v. Bristol and Exeter Ry.

THE RECOVERY OF MONEY PAID UNDER PROTEST.

665

Co., 6 Exch. 702; Parker v. Great Western Ry. Co., 49
E. C. L. R. 253; Baxendale v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co.,
4 C. B. N. S., 63; Baxendale v. Great Westernz Ry. Co., 32
L. J. Repts. 225; S. C. affirmed by Cockburn, C. J., 32 L. J.
Repts. N. S. 197; Peddington v. Ry. Co., C. B. Repts. N. S.
vol. 5,I 09. The action is usually brought to recover a
number of illegal charges exacted through a more or less
extended period of time, the right to a recovery arising from
the fact that the common carrier refused in each case to
perform a carriage unless the shipper paid him the overcharge
As we have already pointed out the right to recovery of a
charge illegally exacted by a common carrier, may also arise
through the carrier's refusal to deliver up the goods of the
shipper: Ashmole v. Wainwright, 2 Q. B. 937. When the
shipper's goods are already in the carrier's hands, and the
latter refuses to deliver them except upon the payment of
an illegal charge, the duress is clearly that of property, the
shipper's excuse for payment and subsequent ground of
action being that his goods would otherwise have been
subjected to a wrongful detention. If, on the other hand,
the carrier demands the illegal charge before the goods
have been delivered to him, and the shipper yields to the
demand and pays the charge in order to secure the
carriage of his goods, he has a right of action for the illegal
excess so paid, on the ground that the enjoyment of a right
allowed him by statute, would otherwise have been denied him.
In the earlier cases of money recovered because illegally
demanded as the condition of the performance of a legal duty
due the plaintiff without such payment, the oppression usually
arose from the difference in the positions of the payer and the
payee. They did not treat upon an equal footing. The payer
was an embarrassed debtor and the payee his creditor: Chitty
on Contracts, 912, and cases cited; or the payee was a private
individual and the payee a government officer: Morgan v.
Palmer,2 Barn. & Cr., 729; Stephenson v. Mortimer, Cowp.
805.
Chitty, in his work on contracts, says: "Money obtained by
oppression and by taking advantage of the distresses of others,
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in violation of the laws made for their protection, may be
recovered in an action for money had and received": Chitty
on Contracts, 912, and cases cited. "So," he continues, " it has
been held that this action will lie to recover money paid by the
plaintiff, a bankrupt, as an inducement to the defendant to sigih
his certificate. 'And in like -manner money privately paid to an
outstahding creditor to induce him' to concur with other
creditors in a composition agreement made by an embarrassed
debtor may in some cases be recovered in this action. Thus,
if bills are given to the creditor, either for the amount of the
composition or for the money paid to induce him to execute
the composition deed, and such bills are negotiated by the
creditor and payment thereof is enforced by the holders
against the debtor, it seems that, inasmuch as the fact of thebills being negotiated deprives the debtor of the defence which
he would have had -to an action on the bills by the creditor,
he may, after paying the same, recover the excess from thecreditor as money paid by compulsion."
It was in Smith v. Cuffe, 6 M. & Selw. i6o, a case that presented these conditions, that Lord Ellenborough made hiscelebrated remark about oppression: "This is not a case,"
he said, "of par delicium, but of oppression on one side and
submission on the other. It can never be predicated as par
delictum when one holds the rod and the other bows toit.
There was an inequality of situation between these
parties-one was a creditor, the other a debtor, who was
driven to comply with the terms which the former chose to
enforce." See Smith on Contracts, 303; Lowrey v. Bourdieu, 2Doug. 472; Townson v. Wilson et al. (Lord Ellenborough),.
I Campb. 396.

The oppression, as we have said, may be that of a public
officer over a private individual. "The payment of illegal fees
exacted colore ojficii can seldom be considered voluntary so aq.
to preclude their subsequent recovery": Bouier's Law Dictionary, "Payment Under Protest"; Morgan v. Palmer,2 B. &
C. 729; Chitty on Contracts, 940; Clinton v. Strong, 9 Johns.
370; Baker v. City, II Ohio, 534; 2 Sm. L. C. 4o4; Steele v.
Williams (Martin B.), 8 Exch. 624. The cases in point are-
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very numerous. Thus, in Andrews v. Cawthorne, Willes, 536,
a reeovery was had where the plaintiff had paid a larger burial
fee than was allowed by Act of Parliament. "So," as Chitty
points out, "fees charged by a parish clerk-contrary to
6th and 7 th William III., c. 86, s. 35-for extracts taken from
a register book of burials and baptisms, have been held recoverable from him in this action": Chitly on Contracts, p.
913.

In another case cited by the same author the steward of a
Copyhold Court refused to admit the plaintiff except upon the
payment of certain fines and fees not duly payable. The
plaintiff paid the fines and fees under protest, and was subsequently able to recover them. In a case in Loft's Reports an
illegal charge which had been paid for postage was recovered: Loft, 753.
In Ripley v. Ge/ston, 9 Johns. 201, it appeared that a
Spanish vessel had put into "New York in distress and
had been subsequently sold. Her purchasers, in order to
obtain a clearance, were obliged to pay into the collector's
hands the amount of a certain tonnage duty and light money
which the latter claimed as due to the United States. The
purchasers were thus forced to pay these moneys or subject
their commerce to an injurious interruption. JudgeVan Ness
declared that the payment so made was a compulsory one.
In a Pennsylvania case a recovery was had of certain additional fees illegally exacted from a steamship company by a
United States Shipping Commissioner: American Steamship Co.
v. Young, 8 Norris, 2oi. Judge Sterrett, in delivering the
opinion of the Court, said, that a public officer "who virtute
ofcii demands and takes as fees for his services what is not
authorized or more than is allowed by law should be compelled to make restitution."
The right of a shipper to an action for money had and
received in order to recover from a common carrier the excess
upon an illegal overcharge paid in order to obtain the performance of the carrier's legal duty is, as we have said, well
recognized in England. Such authorities as ChiefJustice Tindal, 49 E. C. L. Repts. 292, 293, Barons Parke and Pollock,
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6 Exch. 702, and Lord ChelmV/rd and Lord Cairns,4 Eng.
& Ir. App. Cases 249, have lent their sanction to this application of the action of assumpsit. Perhaps the leading case is
that of Parker v. The Great Western Railway Company, 7
Manning and Granger, 252. By the Acts of Parliameni under
*which the dcfendant company had bean incorporated it was
provided, that the charges for the carriage of goods should be
reasonable and equal for all persons; and that no reduction or
advance should be made, either directly or indirectly, in favor
of or against any particular person. The plaintiff, it appeared,
was himself an extensive carrier, and like one of our local
express companies, handled the goods which the defendant
carried for him. In other words the defendant in its dealings
with him was saved the extra expense of collecting, loading,
unloading and delivering the goods which it carried. The
allowance, however, which it had allowed other carriers for
such services, it had refused him. It had also in other respects
illegally discriminated against him.',The plaintiff had in the
case of each overcharge first tendered the proper amount and
then paid the excess under protest. Having decided that the
excessive charges so paid to the railway company were not
legally demandable, Chief Justice Tindal sustained the plaintiff's right of action. "We are of the opinion," he said, "thit
the payments were not voluntary. They were made in order
to induce the company to do that which they were bound to
do without them; and for the refusal to do which, an action
on the case might'have been maintained, as 'was expressly
decided in the case of Pickford v. The Grandjunction Railway
Company, io M. & W. 399."
We have found no American decisions directly establishing the right to the common law action for money had
and received against a railroad company where the latter
has demanded and received an illegally excessive charge
for the performance of its legal duty. It would appear,
however, from the respect with which many of our courts
have cited the English decisions on this subject, that the
absence of actual precedent in this country is not due to
any unwillingness on the part of our judiciary to recognize the
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propriety of the common law remedy. The case of Hearsey
v. Pryn, 7 Johns. 179, decided by Judge Spencer, was an
instance of an action scccessfully maintained against a tollgatherer for the recovery of certain bridge tolls which had
been illegally exacted by the defendant. See also Hearsey
v. Boyd (Judge Van Ness), 7 Johns. 183; Lezis v. Hammond, 2 Barn. & Aid. 206; Waterhouse v. Keen, 2 B. & C
200.

III. THE DAY IN COURT. As PLAINTIFF; AS DEFENDANT.
Our examination of those compulsory payments with which
a protest is likely to be coupled would be far .from complete
without referring to one condition which is always deemed
essential to the subsequent recovery. The plaintiff must have
been without his day in court. By this is meant that the
payer, in order successfully to maintain his action for a
recovery, must show that no opportunity was open to
him in a court of law for adequate redress, or to secure
the prevention of the wrong to which, Lut for his act of
payment he would have been subjected. If he had such opportunity, then his payment was not made under circumstances
of immediate or urgent necessity.
It is plain that such an opportunity may present itself in one
of two ways. First, the prayer may have an action at common
law against his oppressor by which adequate redress may be
obtained after the threatened wrong has been inflicted. Secondly, he may have an opportunity to appear in court and
make defence and so prevent the infliction of the wrong. The
latter conditions are present where the only compulsion
threatened is that of the process of a court of competent jurisdiction.
I.He may have an action at common law by which adequate
redress may be obtained after the threatenedinjury is inflicted.
A recovery in the case of Astley v. Reynolds, 2 Strange, 915,
would not, as we have seen, been allowed, had the court been
of opinion that an action of trover would have served the
plaintiff's purpose. Upon the same ruling the decision of
Oates v. Hudson, 6 Exch. 346, was based. In the case of
Sillman et al. v. The United States, I I Otto 465, certain barges
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belonging to the plaintiff's firm had been rented by the Quartermaster General during our Civil War. The latter arbitrarily changed the terms under which it had been agreed to
hold the barges, and refused after a certain date not only to
pay the old rentals, but even to deliver up the barges to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff finally yielded and agreed to make
new charter parties, stating at the time that he did so not voluntarily, but under circumstances of compulsion. The rentals
under the new charter-parties were regularly paid and received.
The Court of Claims would not allow the plaintiffs to go
behind these later charter-parties and recover the money due
upon their original contract. Mr. Justice Harlan, in delivering
the opinion of the Supreme Court, declared that the plaintiffs
had waived their rights under the first charter-parties by substituting others through their own free will. This conclusion
necessarily followed, when it was considered that the plaintiffs
could have enforced at law their original contract, and recovered damages in every way commensurate with the loss that
they would have sustained. The learned Justice might also
have quoted Baron Parke's words in Parker v. Bristol and
Exeter Railway Co., 6 Exch. 702, to.the effect that duress of
goods cannot avoid a contract.
Sometimes the remedy is one whicl is peculiarly appropriate. Where the straight course of resistance is also manifestly
the more convenient one, the ends of justice require that the
plaintiff should not yield to the demand, but proceed to redress
in the path that the law has marked out for him. The law in
such cases does not merely suggest the more direct means of
relief, it confines the plaintiff to the appropriate remedy which
lies open to him. It is mandatory, not directory. This appropropriateremedy may be either at common law or by statute.
The -extraordinary latitude allowed the plaintiff in the action
of aisumpsit for money had and received sometimes makes a
resort to it of doubtful fairness. The nature of the count is so
well understood that we need hadly.do.more than to refer in
passing to a few leading c.ases.
In a note to Dutch v. Warren, I Strange, 4o7, the reasons for
prohibiting its use under certain circumstances are well set
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forth. It should not be employed where it would throw
the burden of special pleading on the defendant: Sir
-RichardNewdigate v. Davy, I Lord Raym., 742; Lindon v.
Hooper, Cowp. 44; Feltham v. Terry, Pasch. 13, George II.
B. R.; or where its application would entrench upon established forms: Power v. Wells, Cowp. 818 ; or where its introduction would be manifestly inconvenient on the grounds of
public policy. The familiar case of Lindon v. Hooper, Cowp.
414, presented the following question: Can " the proprietor
of cattle distrained, doing dainage, who has paid money to
have his cattle delivered to him, bring an action for that money
as had and received to his use ?" Lord Mansfield decided
that the action was not maintainable on the ground that the
.plaintiff should have replevied or brought trespass at the time
of the distraint. In Knibbs v. Hall, I Esp. 84, the defendant
sought to set off against a claim for use and occupation of cer.tain rooms in the City Chambers an overplus of rental which
he had previously paid to the plaintiff in order to avoid a
threatened distress. "Lord Kenyon was of the opinion," says
the reporter, "that this could not be deemed a payment by
-compulsion, as the defendant might by replevin have defended
himself against the distress; that therefore after a voluntary
payment so made he should not be allowed to dispute its
legality, and therefore the evidence was rejected." These
decisions are in every sense leading ones, and the principles
involved in them have been followed in a variety of cases.
See Colwellv. Peden, 3 Watts, 327.
We have suggested that the appropriate remedy may be
one that is specially pointed out by statute. Thus in Phillips
v. Jefferson County, 5 Kansas, 412, one of the reasons for
deciding against the plaintiff was that the legislature had
expressly given a remedy of which he should have availed
himself. The money sought to be recovered had been paid
under protest to the county treasurer in order to redeem
of the plaintiff's certain lands which had been already sold to
-cover the amount of illegal taxes. Tax sale certificates
had already been assigned, and the plaintiff alleged that
he had paid the amount of the. taxes to prevent deeds from
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issuing upon the certificates. The court, however, regarded
his payment as a voluntary one. The laws of his State would
have pointed out a specific means of asserting his title to the
lands. The money which he had paid had been handed over
to the holders of the certificates, and his recovery would have
given rise to complications between the county and those
holders. See also Wabaunsee v. Walker, 8 Kansas, 431;
Hazdrigg v. Donaldson, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 445; Chitty on Contracts,§ 913, and cases cited.
The remedy open to the payer must have been at common
law, and the fact that he might have gone into equity is not
regarded as placing him in the position of one who has had
his day in court. Outside of a few Pennsylvania casesMcCrickart v. City of Pittsburgh, 88 Pa. St. 134; Union Insurance Co. v. Allegheny, ioi Pa. St. 250; and Shaw v. City of Allegheny, i 15 Pa. St. 46-we have seen only one decision that is
at all atvariance with this statement of the law. This was that of
the Mariposa Co. v. Bowman, Deady, 228, a case decided by a
Circuit Court of the United States in the State of California.
It is only necessary to run down the list of the cases already
cited in order to be convinced of the correctness of the assertion we have made. Many, perhaps the majority, of the cases
where a recovery has been allowed were instances of illegal
taxes and assessments paid in order to prevent a seizure and
sale of personal property, cases in which a direct resort to
equity for relief unquestionably lay open to the plaintiffs.
In the Union Ins. Co. v. City of Allegheny, a Pennsylvania case, which we have already cited, an illegal claim
for taxes had been paid in order to avert a sale of real
estate. The lien of the taxes, it will be remembered, had been
divested by a prior judicial sale. The tax sale would have
been wholly unauthorized and void, and no title to the
property would have passed by it. The late Chief Justice Mercur, however, was not content to base his decision on this
ground alone. He adds: "It is said the plaintiff had not its
day in court. True, it had not. The taxes were not laid
against it or its property. The company did not propose to
attack the validity of the assessment. In several of the cases
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cited the party had had no day in court, no hearing or opportunity of being heard; yet he might have had it before making
payment by appropriate action. Failing to avail himself of it,
he waived his rights. So here, by application to the equitable
powers of the court or by bill in equity, execution might have
been stayed and the claim removed from the-record. No immediate or urgent necessity existed for the payment of the
taxes to protect the property of the plaintiffs." The facts in
this case were, as we have already remarked, substantially
those of the later one of Shaw v. Allegheny, I15 Pa. St. 46,
with the one exception that in the latter case the plaintiff had
invoked the equitable powers-of the court for relief, and that
an injunction restraining the city authorities from selling his
property had been refused him, a distinction between the two
cases on which Mr. Justice Sterrett, who delivered the opinion
of the court, seems to have laid especial stress. Adopting in
part the language of the late Chief Justice which we have just
quoted, he bases his decision in favor of the plaintiff's right to
a recovery in the action before him almost, if not entirely, on
the failure of his application to the equity side of the court.
It would, indeed, seem a harsh and unreasonable rule that
the payer of taxes illegally demanded and paid in order to
prevent the sale of his property should, in order to sustain his
right to a recovery, be forced to show not only that he had
no proceeding at law open to him to avert the wrong, but also
that his case was one in which he could not have invoked the
assistance of a chancellor. Such a construction of the "day
in court" as has been pointed out by counsel in a recent
case before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, De La
Questa vs. Insurance Co., 136 Pa. St. 62,-would read like
the very converse of the maxim that limits a resort to
equity, and a suitor may, perchance, hereafter be ruled out
of a court of law upon the ground that he had a full,
adequate and complete remedy in equity.
ii. 7he payee may have an opportunity to appear in court
and make defense, and so prevent the infliction of the threate'zed wrong.
The compulsion here is that of legal process, the day in
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court being had in the very proceedings through which the
injury would have been inflicted. Again, we need hardly do
more than mention in passing a few leading cases. The facts
in Brown v. McKinally, I Esp. 279, were as follows: The
defendant had agreed to sell the plaintiff iron of a certain
-quality for a certain price. Iron of an inferior quality was
delivered, and upon the plaintiff's refusing to pay the put-chase, money agreed upon, the defendant brought suit
-against him. While the suit was still pending he paid
the full amount demanded, declaring, however, at the time,
:that he did so without prejudice to his rights, and that he
intended to recover back by a subsequent action, the
overplus so paid. ' Lord Kenyon naturally would not admit the right to bring this subsequent action. The plaintiff's ground for his suit to recover should have been used as
he basis of his defence to the claim. In short, allow in such
-cases the subsequent right of action, and you in effect try such
'questions twice. See Hamlet,v.. Richardson, 9 Bingh. 644;
Wilson- v. Ray, io Ad. & Ellis, 82. (In this last case,
-certain bills were, paid before the action was brought upon
them.), See also Atlee v. Blackhouse, 3 M. & W. 633;
Carter y. Carter, 5 Bingh. 4o6.
Marriott v. Hampton, 2 Esp. 546, is the other leading
-case on this subject. In it Lord Kenyon pointed out
that Lord Mansfield's ruling in loses v. McFerlan, 2 Burr,
IOO5,only suggested a proper limitation of this, principle,
instead of conflicting, as had been supposed, with the
principle itself. It established that the plaintiff must have
-had a full opportunity to lay before the court all matters
properly belonging to his defence if the consequent judgment
is afterwards to be regarded as final .and conclusive. See
comment upon this case in note to Dutch v. Warren, I
Str. 407.
The effect of such a day in court in precluding a payment
fi'om being afterwards. regarded as compulsory, has been fre•quently recognized in this country:, Rawsonv.,Porter,9 Me.
19; Finnel v. Brew, 31 P. F. Sm. 362; Fed.Ins. Co. v. Rob,inson, I Norris, 357; Taylor v. Board of lealtk, .31 Pa. St..7 3;
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Benson v. Monroe, 7 Cush. 125 ; Mays v. Cincinnati, I Ohio
St. 274; Mayor of Balt. v. Lefferman, 4 Gill (Md.) 425;
Marietta v. Slocomb, 6 Ohio St. 471 ; Robinson v. City Councils,
2 Richardson, 317; Emmons v. Scudder, 115 Mass. 367.
A familiar illustration would be that of a payment of taxes
illegally demanded and paid either before or after the institution of legal proceedings in debt or by scire'facias for their
collection. Thus a recovery was refused in case of Peebles
v. Pittsburgh, IOI Pa. Si. 309.
The Supreme Court of
the State had already said in Taylor v. Board of Health,
"The threat that is supposed to underlie such demands is a
harmless one; that in case of refusal, the appropriate remedies
will be resorted to." A payment of taxes illegally demanded
by an officer who has power and authority vested in him summarily to sell the payer's property in order- to satisfy his
demand is, as we have seen, considered involuntary. The
converse is equally true: Forrest v. Mayor, etc., 13 Abb. Pr.
Repts. (N. Y.) 350; Mlays v. Cinn., I Ohio St, 274. Judge
Dewey in the Boston and Sandwich Glass Company v. City of
Boston, 4 Metc. i81, declared that where the officer can
enforce his demands only by a suit of law, the party desiring
to resist the claim must do so at the threshold. "The parties,"
he went on to say, "treat with each other on equal terms, and
if litigation is intended by the party of whom the money is
demanded, it should precede payment."
It follows from what we have said that the threat to enforce
a contract by appropriate legal proceedings can seldom render
a payment compulsory. Thus, in Forbes v. Appleton, 5 Cush.
115, a payment by-the obligor upon a bottomry bond, in
order to prevent the obligee from enforcing it and so taking possession of the payer's vessel, was considered voluntary.
The obligee could only have obtained possession of the ship by a suit upon the bond itself. See also
Flower v. Lance, S9 N. Y. 603.

IV.

THE.CASES WHERE NOTICE IS NECESSARY.

AND GRADES OF DURESS.

THE FORMS

THE PAYEE, AN AGENT.

We have been discussing one general condition essential to
the plaintiff's right to a recovery. In some few cases some-
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thing more is demanded by the court. The payer must
sometimes show that at the time of the payment, he gave the
payee notice of the illegality of his exaction. This notice
usually takes its form in the protest.
Where the duress springs from the commission of a manifest wrong, the courts will not stop to consider whether the
person exercising 'the duress was aware of the illegality of
See, for instance, Astley v. Reynolds, 2
his proceeding.
Strange, 915; Snowden v. Davis, I Taunt. 359; Irving

All duress, however, is not
v. Wilson, 4 Term 485.
equally mischievous and reprehensible. It would therefore appear that there are cases on the border line between

voluntary and involuntary payments where from the equivocai character of the duress as well as from other circumstances attending the payment, the plaintiff should in good
faith have brought to the defendant's notice the wrongfulness
of the exaction. See opinion of Paxson, C. J., in De La Questa
v. Ins. Co., 136 Pa. St. 75. A purely voluntary payment may
readily be recognized. Where, too, the duress is clear and
unmistakeable, the dissent of the payer is self-evident. His
act is open to but one interpretation. It in no sense implies
an admission of the justice or legality of the demand. But on
the other hand, where the duress is less pronounced, and its
character more equivocal, such an admission will in some cases
be inferred unless the plaintiff expressly declare his dissent to
the transaction. Here it is only by a positive expression of
his dissent that he can reserve his future right to a recovery.
It is his duty to speak. Having the power and opportunity
to do so, his silence carries with it the inlplication of consent.
Valpy v. Manly, I M. G. & S.594 (Chief Justice Tindal); Grt.
West. Ry. Co. v. Sulton, L. R. 4 H. L. C. 24 9 ; Hearsey v. Pryn,
7 Johns. 179; Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Peters 137; Allentown v.
Saegar, 20 Pa. St. 42x ; Meek v. McClure, 49 Cal. 623.
This analysis of the duty of giving notice in certair cases has been
suggested by a note in Kaufmann's Mackeldey, 163. In referring
to the maxim qui tacet consentit, Kaufmann points out that common sense
would dictate that it should be understood with the limitation that would
be given to it by the interpolation after the word "'tacet" of the words
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"ubi voluntatem exprimerejiotuit et debuit," a limitation that implies
the duty of expressing one's dissent to a transaction whenever his silence
-would admit of no other explanation than that he freely consented.

Is it possible by classifying the different forms and grades
,of duress, to separate those cases of payments where protest is
-essential from those where it is not? This, it would seem,
can be done only in a very imperfect way, the cases that bear
,directly upon the subject being exceedingly few in number.
It might on first thought appear that a distinction might be
-drawn as to the necessity for a protest between payments made
under what is, strictly speaking, known as duress of property,
and payments made under that duress which arises upon the
withholding of a legal duty, but such a distinction would not
be in harmony with the decisions either in this country or in
England.
It is, however, quite clear that where the compulsion
is in itself illegal, where for instance one's property is
seized or detained without any color of legality or screen of
legal process, there notice to the wrongdoer should be regarded
as superfluous. As for instance in the leading case of Astley
v. Reynolds, 2 Strange, 915, where the only excuse that the
payee, a pawnbroker, had for retaining possession of the property was the refusal on the part of the plaintiff to pay a manifestly illegal charge. So, where a raft of lumber was wrongfilly detained: Chase v. Dwinal,7 Greenl. 134; or where deeds
of special value to the plaintiff were threatened with destruction: Motz v. Mitchell, 91 Pa. St. 114. So again where money
is obtained by "taking advantage of the distresses of others, in
-violation of laws made for their protection," notice will not
usually be necessary. Chitty on Contracts, 939, Thus in the
-cases already cited of bankrupts and insolvent debtors suing
to recover money extorted from them by creditors, who in
refusing to perform their legal duties had extraordinary opportunity for oppression and extortion: Simith v. Bromley, 2 Doug.
.696; Smith v. Cuffe, 6 M. & Selw. 16o; Lowry v. Bourdieu, 2 Doug, 472. So it would seem that the payment of
illegal fees exacted colore offcii need not be accompanied by
.a protest: Morgan v. Palmer, 2 Barn & Cr. 729; Clinton v.
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Strong, 9 Johns. 370; American Steams
Norris, 20I.

Co. v. Young, 8

Judge Dewey, to judge from the opinion which he delivered
in the Glass Company's case, 4 Metc. I8I, already cited, held
that the payment of taxes to a collector armed with a warrant
to sell need not be accompanied by a protest. But see C. J.
Shaw's words, 12 Pick. 14.
In Pennsylvania the decisions on this point are not conclusive. In McCrickart v. City of 1-ittsburg, 88 Pa. St.
134, the' ourt 'said, "Had the plaintiff and those whom
he represents paid their taxes under protest, or with notice to
reclaim them, they might have had some legal ground to
stand upon." See also Hospital v. Philadelphia County, 12
Harris 229, and opinion of Paxson, C. J., in De La Questa
v. Ins. Co., 136 Pa. St. 175.

In California a protest must accompany such a payment of
illegal taxes, unless the collector already is cognizant of their
illegality: MMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 365; Meek v.
McClure, 49 Cal. 623 ; Faulkerv. Hunt, 16 Cal. I69.
Where a number of claims are satisfied by one act of pay-

ment, some of the claims being legal and others illegal, a protest against the exaction of the illegal ones should generally
be made. Here is clearly a case where the implication of
assent needs such rebuttal. See Trakerne et at. v. Gardner et
al 5 Ell. and BI. 913; McMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 365.
It would appear from the English decisions that a protest
should accompany the payment of an illegal charge made by a
shipper to a common carrier in order to induce the latter to
perform a carriage. See Great Western Ry. Co. v. Sutton, L
R. 4 H. L. C. 249.
It seems that where an illegal license fee has been paid to a,
municipal corporation, neither payer nor payee being at the
time aware of the illegality of such fee, there, inasmuch as the
payer has received in the shape of his license a more or less
valuable consideration for his money, the fact that he failed to
protest may subsequently prevent him from recovering: Mays
v. Cincinnati, I Ohio St. 274; Allentown v. Saegar, 20 Pa. St.

421.

The corporation under such circumstances is not
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obliged by law to refund the amount that it illegally exacted.
This would indeed follow from the very nature of the actior.
for money had and received, which, as well known, lies only
for money which the defendant in equity and good conscience
cannot retain in his posession. In Mays v. Cincinnati, I Ohio.
St. 274, the plaintiff it appeared, had paid excessive license fees
for selling poultry, fruit, etc., in one of the markets of Cincinnati. He had paid these license fees without making any protest during the period of three successive years. Judge Ranney, of the Supreme Court of Ohio, before whom the question
as to the recovery of the license fees ultimately came', stateg.
among other reasons for deciding against the plaintiff the fact
that the money was paid by him without protest or any notice
whatever that he intended to recover it back. Another case
in point is that of Allentown v. Saegar, 20 Pa. St. 421,.
already cited. There the borough had laid a tax upon
moneys at interest, which had been subsequently declared
unconstitutional. The plaintiff had paid it together with onewhich was legally authorized before the tax in question had
been declared unconstitutional. Judge Lowrie, when the
action for recovery came before him, said: "The payment of
the tax was a submission to legitimate authority, which was
prima fade right in its exercise." * * * "This was an.
assent to pay more in support of the government of a town
than the town had a right to demand, and the law does not,
imply the duty of refunding. If it had been paid under protest, that is, with notice that he (the plaintiff) would claim it
back, this would repel the implication of an assent and give
rise to the right of reclamation." See also Robinson v. City
Council,4 Rich. 317; Mfowatt v. Wrgt, I Wendell, 360.
So far our investigation as to the necessity of giving notice
has been confined to an examination into the forms and grades.
of duress. Sometimes, however, there is present another element which suggests a different line of analysis. The payee
may have demanded and received the money not in his own
right, but as the agent of a third party. It is plain that where
money is voluntarily paid under a mutual mistake of fact to an
agent, the latter is liable so long as he retains possession of

68o

THE RECOVERY OF MONEY PAID UNDER PROTEST.

the money, but that after he pays it over bonafide to his principal, the payer's suit for recovery must be brought against
the latter. Cox v. Prentice (Ld. Ellenborough), 3 M. & Selw.
348; Buller v. Harrison(Ld. Mansfield), 2 Cowp. 568; Stevenson v. Mortimer (Ld. Mansfield), 2 Cowp. 805 ; Greenway
v. Hurd,4 Term. 554. Where, however, the plaintiff's ground
of action is duress, not mistake, the question as to the agent's
liability must be answered differently.
Mr. Justice Thompson, in the case of Elliott v. Swartwout, 'o
Peters, 137, seems to be of the opinion that in the case of a
compulsory payment to an agent notice is never necessary.
No less an authority than Judge Van Ness held apparently the
same view. Ripley v. Gelston, 9 Johns. 201. See also Judge
Spencer's opinion in Hearsey v. Pryn, 7 Johns. 179. It
seems to' us, however, that such a sweeping rule is not
supported by the cases. There are two questions which
should invariably be answered before a recovery from the
agent is to be allowed. These are:
(I). Did the duress arise through the fault of the agent
himself, or was he simply the unconscious channel of the
illegal compulsion?
(2). Did the plaintiff pay the money expressly to the agent's
use or to the use of no one in particular, or did he pay it
expressly to the use of the principal?
I. In the case of Snowden v. Davis, I Taunt. 359, the
defendant, a bailiff, had overstepped the terms of two
warrants that had been placed in his hands. Under the
first the plaintiff paid a larger sum than was called for in the
warrant; under the second he paid a sum which, by the very
words of the warrant, should not have been collected from
him. Lord Mansfield allowed the plaintiff to recover from the
bailiff the amount of money which the latter had wrongfully
demanded and received. The fact that no actual notice had
been given the defendant before he had paid the money over
to his principal, made not a particle of difference. The defendant, Lord Mansfield pointed out, had in the case of each warrant acted under no authority at all. From the very circumstances of the case it was impossible to suppose that the plain'
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tiff had paid the money to the use of anybody in particular.
See also Andrews v. Cawthorne, Willes, 536; Oates v.
Hudson (Baron Parke's opinion), 6 Exch. 348; Parker v.
-Railway Co., 6 Exch. 705, 706, Ripley v. Gelston, 9 Johns.
201, it will be remembered, was the case of a payment
by some ship-owners to a collector of a port in order
to obtain a clearance for their vessel. No protest had
been made, and the money had been paid over by
the defendant to his principal. Judge Van Ness, however,
held the collector liable on the general ground that the payment
had been a compulsory one. With all respect to the authority
of the learned jurist, we think that he might have based
his decision upon a more specific ground. The defendant himself had been clearly at fault. It was of his own motion and
upon his own responsibility that he refused to grant the clearance; he was in no sense the unwitting instrument of a compulsion. The money was obtained by his own "illegal act, and
he could not discharge himself by paying it over": Lord
Ellenborough in Townson v. Wilson, I Campb. 397. Judge
Spencer, in Harsey v. Pryn, 7 Johns. 179, which was an
action brought against a toll-collector, lays great stress upon
the fact that notice had been given him of the illegality of his
demands. This, however, was clearly a case that called for
notice on the ground that the defendant could not have been
expected otherwise to know the peculiar reasons for the plaintiff's exemption from the toll charge.
The opinion of the Snpreme Court of the United States in
Elliott v. Swartwout, 1o Peters, 137, was given upon two supposed cases. It was asked:
(I). "Whether the collector is personally liable in an action
to recover back an excess of duties paid to him as collector,
and by him in the regular or ordinary course of his duty paid
into the Treasury of the United States; he, the collector, acting
in good faith and under instructions from the Treasury Department, and no protest being made at the time of payment, or
notice not to pay the money over, or intention to sue to recover
back the amount given him."
(2). "Whether the collector is personally liable in an action
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to recover back an excess of duties paid to him as collector,
and by him paid over in the regular and ordinary course of
his duty into the Treasury of the United States, he, the collector, acting in good faith and under instructions from the
Treasury Department, a notice having been given him at the
time of payment that the duties were charged too high, and that
the party paying so paid to get possession of his goods, and
intended to sue to recover back the amount erroneouslypaid,and
a notice not to pay over the amount into the Treasury." Mr. Justice Thompson, in reviewing the law on the subject both in
England and America, came to the conclusion that the collector would not be liable in the first case, but that he would.
be in the second. He says: "From this view of the cases, it
may be assumed as the settled doctrine of the law that where
money is .illegally demanded and received by an agent he
cannot exonerate himself from personal responsibility by
paying it over to his principal, if he had notice not to pay it
over." This decision is now valuable only, as an illustration ofthe doctrine that we are discussing, inasmuch as the whole
matter has since been made the subject of statutory regula-tion.'

As we have already suggested in another connection, it has.
been decided by the Supreme Court of California that where
the collection of certain State or city taxes is unauthorized for
reasons not necessarily apparent to the collector, as for instance,.
because of some irregularity in their assessment not appearing
,3oo--3o3. An Act of Congress
(i.) See Aevised Statutes ofU. S.
now requires that the importer shall file a written protest with the Collector. As to internal revenue tax cases, Mr. ChiefJustice Waite says: "In
Railroad Co. v. Commissioners,98 U. S. 544, that the actions in Philadelphia v. Collector, 5 Wall. 370, and Collectorv. Hubbard,12 Id. 13, were
sustained "upon the grcund that' the several provisions of the internal
revenue Acts referred to warranted the conclusion as a necessary implication that Congress intended to give the tax-payer such a remedy. It is so
expressly stated in the last case, p. x4. As the case ofErskine v. Van
Arsdale,i5 Id. 75, followed these, and was of the same general character,
it is to be presumed that it was put upon the same ground. In such cases
the protest plays the same part that it does in customs cases and gives
notice that the payment is not to be considered as admitting the right to.
make the demand."
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upon the papers handed him to guide him in the collection,
there notice to the collector of the reasons for the payer's
belief in such illegality must be served upon the collector.
Meek v. McClure,49 Cal. 623. The Supreme Court of Michigan has said: "There are such practical hardships in permitting persons to be held liable to an action where no protest
is made pointing out the reasons why a collector should withhold action under his warrant, that it is a proper subject for
legislative consideration whether some provision should not
be made to regulate the matter." A/tell v. 2 eluf, 26 Mich.
ri8.
We mentioned another question which should be asked
where the payment was to an agent. It was, did the plaintiff
pay the money expressly to the agent's use or to the use of
no one in particular, or did he pay it expressly to the use of
the principal ? In other words, did the payer so make his
payment as to lead the payee into error? The famous case of
Sadler v. Lvans, 4 Burr. 1984, is an instance in point. Therethe defendant was the receiver of an estate and in that capacity
demanded the payment of certain sums. The plaintiff admitted
that he had paid the defendant the sums in question expressly
to the use of the proprietress of the estate. Lord Mansfield
had no difficulty in deciding that the plaintiff should be nonsuited, and that the action, if it lay at all, should have been
brought against the proprietress. The understanding of the
parties at the time was clearly that the money was collected to
be paid over to the principal. A more recent recognition of
this doctrine is to be found in the New York case of Fye v.
Lockwood, 4 Cowan, 456, where a court-martial fine illegally
demanded had been paid to the defendant with the express
understanding that it should be remitted to his principal.
V. THE FORM OF THE PROTEST.
It has been said that a protest in its general sense is "an
express declaration by a person doing an act that the act is
not to give rise to an implication which it might otherwise
The
cause": Rapalje & Lawrence's Law Diet., "Protest."
author refers to 3 Say. Syst., 246; Hilliardv. Eiffe, L. R. 7 H.
L. C. 4o. See also Abbot's Law Diet., "Protest," § I.
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Burrill defines the word as "a solemn declaration against
an act about to be done, or already done, expressive of disapprobation or dissent; or made with a view of preserving some
right which but for such declaration might be taken to be
relinquished, or of exonerating the party protesting from some
liability which might otherwise attach to him": Burril's
Law Dkt., "Protest."
It would appear that the protest which accompanies the
making of an involuntary payment is primarily an expedient
of the payer's adopted by him in order to escape the legal
inferences of his act. It is analogous to the old protestation
of the pleader, it is "the exclusion of a conclusion": Stephen
on Pleading,218 ; Cokr upon Lit., 124 b.; and yet we shall see
that such is true only in a very limited sense of the protest
which we are discussing.'
We must not confound the notice in certain cases where
money has been paid under a mistake of fact with the protest
which we have under discussion. The purpose of the notice
given in cases of mistake is entirely different, and it is, conse-<tuently, governed by different rules. It usually takes the
form of a demand for the money, and, as we have already seen,
fixes the liability of a payee agent where the money has not
already passed out of his hands : Cox v. Prentice,3 M. & Selw.
344; Buller v. Harrison, Cowp. 566.' Where, however, the
sole ground for recovery is the fact of compulsion, the notice
given includes an objection, and to be effectual as such it must be
made at the time of payment: Abbot's Law Dict., "Protest." § 6.
Thus in Benson v. Monroe,7 Cushing, 125, a Massachusetts
case, where illegal head moneys were demanded of the master
of a ship and finally paid by him in oider to dissolve an
(i.) The protest defined by Merlin (Rdpertoire de Jurisprudence, Protestation) has evidently a much broader application. It may, however,
be well to quote his words. He says: "C'est une ddclaration qu'on fait
par quelque acte contre la fraude, 1'oppression on la violence de quelqu'un
on contre la nullitd d'une procddure, d'un jugement on de tout autre
acte, par laquelle ddclaration on proteste, que ce qui a dtd fait on qui serait
fait au contraire, ne pourra nuire ni prdjudicier a. celui qui proteste, lequel
se rdserve de se pourvoir en temps et lieu contre .ce qui fait 1'objet de sa
protestation."
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attachment of his vessel, his attempt after payment to induce
the defendant to sign a paper acknowledging the payment to
have been made under protest was regarded as a circumstance
militating against the right of recovery.
Moreover, the protest with which we are concerned is more
than a naked objection. The payer may object to satisfying
a demand for other reasons than its illegality. He may deem
the claim a harsh and unreasonable one, and urge upon the
payee that he has no moral right to enforce it. Such an
objection carries with it no intimation that the legality of the
claim is disputed, and no warning of subsequent proceedings
to test the payee's right to the money which he has exacted.
In order, also, that the protest should not be regarded as a
mere objection it should be made contemporaneously with the
act of payment. In Greenzvay v. Hurd, 4 Term, 553, a
collector of the excise was sued for certain duties illegally
demanded and paid by the plaintiff under alleged circumstances of duress. It appeared that the plaintiff had objected
to the duties when first levied, but after a month's interval he had yielded and paid the full amount of the
demand. The officer, having already paid the money over
to his superiors, was not held liable. Lord Kenyon took the
ground that the defendant was entitled to notice. He speaks
of the plaintiff as having led the defendant into an error, and
Buller, J., says that the plaintiff "seemed afterwards to waive"
the objections he had made. See this case as commented on
by Mr. Justice Thompson in Eltiott v. Swartwout, 10 Peters,
137. In Rawson v. Porter, 9 Maine, ii9, the defendant
was an attorney who had been retained ,by some creditors
of the plaintiff to press some claims of theirs against
him. The defendant had caused certain goods of the
plaintiff to be attached, but a compromise was effected
under which this attachment was set aside, the plaintiff
promising to transfer to the defendant certain other items
of property.
In a dispute which followed as to the costs
in the attachment suit the plaintiff "strenuously objected"
against paying a certain 22 per cent. commission. He, however, finally yielded, and gave the defendant a promissory note
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for the amount. The Supreme Court of the State would not
allow the plaintiff to recover the sum paid upon this pronissory note. It was plain indeed that the plaintiff had had his
day in court, because he could have resisted the collection of
his note; but, as though to dispel all doubt as to the nature of
his payment, the court distinctly adds: "He gave no intimation at the time of any intention to reclaim the money as paid
by compulsion or unjustly extorted."
It may be said that the protest that accompanies a compulsory payment is a declaration, oral or written, made by the
payer of money illegally exacted, and made at the time of the
payment, to the effect that the money so paid is illegally
exacted. The payer may couple with his protest a formal statement to the effect that he intends to institute legal proceedings
for a recovery of the money he has paid. Though such an
express reservation of his right is often added, it appears from
the decisions that such a reservation may also be implied
from a protest such as we have defined: Val.y v. Manly, r
M. G. & S. 594; Hearsey v. Pryn, 7 Johns. 179.
The courts have drawn no distinction between an oral and a
written protest, one being regarded quite as efficacious as the
other.'
Abbot, in his Law Dictionary,"Protest," § 6, says: "As far
as form is concerned, almost any which is distinct and certain,
and gives the creditor or claimant means of reducing the
demand to limits within which it can be sustained, is sufficient."
Where a protest is due a government collector, it should
point out with more or less particularity the illegality complained of. See the protest that was offered in Marriott v.
Brune, 9 Howard, 622. See also Atwellv.Zeluff, 26 Mich. I I8.
A California case has shown the necessity in some cases of
carefully considering the nature of one's protest: Meek v.
McClure, 49 Cal. 623. An action had been brought against a
tax collector to recover part of a municipal assessment paid
(i.) The protest required by law to be madein the case ofa payment ofan
illegal duty to a United States Customs Collector must be in writing. See
U. S. Rev. St. N 3010-3013.
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under circumstances of duress. The sum claimed as wrongfully exacted from the plaintiff had been added to the original
sum levied by the assessors by-a certain Board of Equalization. The latter had power to increase the assessments upon
properties, but not to do so without giving a hearing to the
owners. On this occasion the board had not heard the
objections of the plaintiff, but had summarily increased the
value of his property. .The amount which he claimed as due
him from the collector was the illegal increment thus added
to his taxes. The court, however, would not allow him to
recover. Notice in the form of a protest had indeed been
served upon the officer, the case being one that required
notice according to the decisions in California. But the court
went further. It declared that, though the plaintiff had stated
in his protest the precise amount of the sum illegally exacted,
the defendant had not been informed of a fact which the plaintiff was bound to bring to his notice. The plaintiff should
have pointed out his reasons for believing the exaction of that
amount illegal. The court's words are: "In this case the
defendant was not informed by the protest that the plaintiff
claimed that the action of the Board of Equalization was void,
and there was nothing in the assessment roll or other document which came into the hands of the tax collector which
would impart notice to him that the action of the Board of
Equalization in increasing the valuation of the plaintiff's property
was void because the order was made without any complaint
having been filed before the board stating that the valuation
was too high. The protest, in our opinion, was not sufficient
to entitle the plaintiff to maintain an action to recover back
the amount paid on account of the increase of the valuation of
the property."
VI.

LIMITATIONS UPON THE EFFECT OF THE PROTEST.

Does the protest serve any other purpose than that of
notice? Does it in any way affect the equities of the parties?
Reasoning from the cases the problem presented is at first
puzzling. See, for instance, Mr. Justice Thompson's opinion
in Elliott v. .5wartwout, IO Peters, 137, and Judge Lowrie's in
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All ntown v. Saegar, 20 Pa. St. 421. See also the opinion of
the court in Meek v. McClure, 49 Cal. 623.
The fact that the payer protested is often important in
establishing the compulsion. Its weight with the jury may
be of value. Like any other part of the transaction, the fact
of the protest may be offered by the plaintiff as tending to,
show the involuntary character of his payment. See in particular the opinion of the court in McMillan v. Richards, 9
Cal. 365. It is analogous to and represents the physical resistance which accompanies duress of life and limb.
On the other hand, a protest alone and unsupported by
other evidence of compulsion is of no value. This is.
so from the very nature of the protest. It is only a
declaration made by the payer at the time of the paymentThe reductio ab absurdum is obvious. Once admit that the
fact of compulsion may be prima facie proved by showing
that the plaintiff made a protest, and one has the spectacle of a
voluntary payment rendered involuntary by an act of the payer
himself.I
It is surprising, however, how often counsel, in the face
of this almost self-evident limitation on the effect of a protest, have -contended for a recovery on the ground alone of
the existence of the protest. Misapprehension has probably
arisen from two causes. First, the count for money had and
received allows the offer of mistake and fraud as well as compulsion, and the precise grounds of the decision of the court in
a particular case are not always distinctly recognizable. Secondly, actions in form that of assumpsit for money had and
received, have been expressly or impliedly given by statute in
cases where, strictly speaking, they would not have laid at
common law. So, for instance, as Chief Justice Waite has
pointed out actions against the officers of the internal
(r.) See for instance Brown v. AicKinally, ji Esp. 279; Flee/wood v.
City of New York, 2 Sandf. 476; Forbes v. Aibleton, 5 Cush. 18; Union
Ins. Co. v. City ofAllegheny, iox Pa. 250; Peebles v. Pittsburgh, bit Pa.
St. 304; Bmruniagin v. Tillinghast. 18- Cal. 265; Smith v. Shroeder, 15
Minn. 35. The last two cases show the necessity of bringing the action
for recovery against the person who is responsible for the duress.
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revenue have been allowed under special statutory regulations,
and in such cases the protest rightly plays a much more
important part as one of the conditions of a recovery. Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 98 U. S. 541.
We shall content ourselves in this connection with quoting
a few dicta. " Protest has nothing whatever to do with voluntary payments." "It is available only in cases of duress or
coercion, or when undue advantage is taken of the party's
situation:" lMcMillan v. Richards,9 Cal. 365. Among other
cases the court cites Chase v. Dwinall,7 Greenl. 134; Clinton v.
-Strong,9 Johns. 370; Forrestv. iayor, etc., 13 Abb. Pr. Repts.
350. "A party who has paid voluntarily under a claim of right
shall not afterwards recover back the money, although he protested at the time against his liability": Chief Justice Shaw in
Preston v. Boston, 12 Pick. 13. See also Lee v. Inhabitants,
13 Gray 476. " People might regularly pay under protest and
await the chances of illegality ": Detroit v. Martin, 22 Am.
Rep. 512. "Where there is no legal compulsion, a party
yielding to the assertion of an unjust claim, cannot detract
from the force of his concession by saying, ' I object,' or 'I
protest,' at the same time that he actually pays the claim.
The pajiment nullifies the protest as effectually as it obviates
the previous denial and contestation of the claim": Forrestv.
."fayor, etc., 13 Abb. Pr. Repts. (N. Y.) 350. See also Cook v.
Boston, 9 Allen 893; Flower v. Lance, 59 N. Y. 603; Emmons
v. Scnedder, I 15 Mass. 369; Phillips v. jeferson Co., 5 Kan.
412; 4 Wait's Act. & Def. 493, and cases cited. In Railroad
Co. v. C0,mmissioners, 98 U. S. 542, the late Chief Justice
Waite quoted with approbation the following words of the
court in lVabaunsee Couay v. Walker, 8 Kans. 431: "Where
a party pays an illegal demand with a full knowledge of all the
facts which render such a demand illegal, without an immediate or urgent necessity therefor, or unlest to release his person
or property from detention, or to prevent an immediate seizure
of his person or property, such payment must be deemed
voluntary and cannot be recovered back. And the fact that
the party at the making of the payment files a written protest
do,-s not make the payment inx oluntarv ..... This," the Chief
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Justice continues, "is as we understand it, a correct statement
of the rule of the common law. There are, no doubt, cases to
be found in which the language of the court, if separated from
the facts of the particular case under consideration, would
seem to imply that a protest alone was sufficient. to show that
the payment was not voluntary; but on examination it will be
found that the protest was used to give effect to the other
attending circumstances."
A very practical distinction has been observed by the courts
of California, Michigan, Massachusetts, and possibly some
other States, as to the allowance of interest in cases where it
was clearly the duty of the plaintiff to protest: Meek v.
McClure, 49 Cal. 623; Atwell v. Zeluff, 26 Mich. 120; McKee
v. Campbell,27 Mich. 497; Detroit v. Martin, 22 Am. Rep.
512. See also Vermont Central R. R. Co. v. Bvrlington, 28
Vt. 193. and Henry v. Chester, 15 Vt. 470. Under such circum-

stances interest upon the money will be allowed only from the
time that notice of the illegality of the demand was served
upon the defendant. Where no notice is given before the
institution of the proceedings to recover, interest runs only
from the date of the service of the writ. In Atwell v. Zeluff,
26 Mich. 120, the court, referring to two Massachusetts cases,
Amesbury ManufacturingCo. v. Inhabitants,17 Mass. 461; and
Glass Co. v. Boston, 4 Metc. 181, said: "Where the money is
not paid under protest, it is there (i. e. in Massachusetts) held
that no interest should be allowed until the demand is made
or the action is brought, so as to put the party sued in actual
fault for not making satisfaction as soon as the wrong is
pressed upon his notice. A payment without protest may
prevent him from making inquiry and examining into the law,
and while ignorance will not excuse an illegal demand, it may
very properly qualify the extent of damages for a merely technical wrong." It is to be regretted that rulings upon this
subject have not been more common.
In Mclfillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 365, it was decided that "a redemption of property sold under a decree of foreclosure was accomplished by a
payment under protest of the amount claimed to be due by the sheriff
though certain portions claimed were disputed." The court said the
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does not create a lien upon the money paid, or any legal impediits control. It does not impair, in any respect, the operative
the payment as a discharge of the demand upon which it is
far as such demand is legal."
SUMMARY.

Money paid under protest and subsequently recovered must
then have been paid also under circumstances of compulsion,
unless the case is specially excepted by statute from the rules
governing the action for money had and received.
As regards involuntary payments the old duress of Blackstone and the other commentators has long been expanded so
as to embrace a threatened injury to property as well as person. Money paid in order to avert a threatened seizure or
detention of personal property-sometimes, though rarely, a
sale of real property-or paid under certain conditions in
order to induce another to perform a legal duty wrongfully
withheld by him, may now be recovered in an action of
assumpsit. It is only in such cases of involuntary payments
that the protest plays its part. It is only in such cases, based
on refinements of the old durfites, that the protest becomes
the subject of consideration.
To establish a payment under duress, the plaintiff must show
that he was without "his day in court." If he had it either
as plaintiff in a proceeding by which adequate redress against
the threatened injury might have been obtained by him, or if
the wrong could have been inflicted only by legal process
against which he might have made defence, he cannot afterwards maintain his action for recovery.
In a few cases a compulsory payment may be proved, and
yet the courts may refuse to allow the plaintiff to recover.
The plaintiff must sometimes, though rarely, it is true, show
that he objected against the illegality of the exaction in such
a way as to give an unmistakable coloring to his act of payment and an express or implied warning to the payee of the
legal proceedings he intended to institute. In other words,
in some few cases the payer must protest. These cases are
not well defined. The courts have not laid down the law
concerning them in clear and precise terms. Perhaps it was

